Social Security Programs and Retirement around the World: The Relationship to Youth Employment by Melika Ben Salem et al.
This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the National Bureau of 
Economic Research
Volume Title: Social Security Programs and Retirement around the World: The 
Relationship to Youth Employment 
Volume Author/Editor: Jonathan Gruber and David A. Wise, editors
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN:  978-0-226-30948-4; 0-226-30948-7
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/grub08-1
Conference Date: 
Publication Date: February 2010
Chapter Title: Labor Force Participation by the Elderly and Employment of the 
Young: The Case of France
Chapter Author: Melika Ben Salem, Didier Blanchet, Antoine Bozio, Muriel Roger
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8254
Chapter pages in book: (119 - 146)119
4
Labor Force Participation by 
the Elderly and Employment 
of the Young
The Case of France
Melika Ben Salem, Didier Blanchet, Antoine Bozio, 
and Muriel Roger
4.1    Introduction
One of the justiﬁ  cations that has been provided for early retirement poli-
cies in developed countries is the idea that such policies can facilitate access 
to the labor market for younger people and help lower global unemploy-
ment. Such a belief has undoubtedly played a role in France, where early 
retirement policies started to expand during the 1970s in response to rising 
unemployment.
Three decades later, France not only ends up with one of the lowest 
employment rates for the elderly among the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development countries but also with one of the high-
est youth unemployment rates. Given such an outcome, beliefs about the 
eﬃciency of early retirement policies have considerably lost ground. Even 
if the idea of making room for new generations remains a frequent self-
 justiﬁ   cation  for  individuals  who  choose  to  retire  early,  few  economists  or 
policymakers would now argue that early retirement policies are a miracle 
tool for ﬁ  ghting unemployment. The political agenda has rather shifted 
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toward increasing activity and employment rates for older workers, espe-
cially since the 2003 pension reform.
But some questions remain. One is retrospective: how far must we push 
the idea that these policies have been ineﬀective or counterproductive? Can 
we deﬁ  nitely be conﬁ  dent that such policies have been of no help, even for 
the short run? To put it in another way, would our labor market situation 
have been better or worse without these early retirement policies?
The other question is symmetrical and prospective: are we sure that re-
turning to higher retirement ages will have no adverse eﬀects on unemploy-
ment rates? This remains a key political issue in France (Blanchet and Legros 
2002). There are some advocates of the supply-  side view that a strong posi-
tive shock on incentives to remain in the labor force for older workers could 
be suﬃcient to increase the employment rate for older workers while caus-
ing no harm to younger ones (D’Autume, Betbeze, and Hairault 2005). But 
detractors of such a policy argue that at least in the short run, it will only 
make unemployment worse for all age groups, with no net ﬁ  nancial gains for 
social insurance. They believe that measures aimed at increasing the retire-
ment age should not be pursued before any signiﬁ  cant decline of the unem-
ployment rate or even before the downturn of the labor force leads us to 
situations of labor shortage. In short, even if there is an increasing consensus 
on the fact that increasing the retirement age is more or less unavoidable in 
front of expected demographic trends, views continue to diverge concerning 
the optimal timing, intensity, and modalities of such an increase.
In this context, any empirical element on the articulation between retire-
ment policies and general equilibrium on the labor market is welcome. The 
present chapter will try to contribute to this debate by concentrating on 
the retrospective issue. Its objective is to study the long-  term relationship 
between labor force participation (LFP) of the old and unemployment of 
the young. The chapter will be organized as follows. Section 4.2 will be 
devoted to a presentation of the main reforms of social security and early 
retirement schemes since the beginning of the 1970s. We will pay particular 
attention to the role played by labor market considerations in justifying 
these reforms. Section 4.3 will then present one assessment of the incidence 
of these changes on labor market outcomes for younger workers. This ﬁ  rst 
approach will correlate LFP for older workers with employment or unem-
ployment rates for young or middle- age workers. One limit of this approach 
is that changes in LFP rates for senior workers do not only reﬂ  ect the impact 
of retirement policies. Employment rates for all age groups are inﬂ  uenced by 
general labor market conditions, and this might lead to spurious correlation 
due to a simultaneity issue. Controlling for the economic cycle is one way 
to minimize this bias, but this comes at a cost—namely, that of abandon-
ing the search for an unconditional relationship between young and old 
employment. The main criticism of economists regarding early retirement 
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Testing substitution conditional on output would therefore not be suﬃcient 
to establish the long-  term eﬃciency or ineﬃciency of these policies. Even 
when controlling for the economic cycle, one may want to look for more 
direct eﬀects of pension reforms on employment of the youth.
Therefore, the rest of the chapter tries to adopt another strategy, which 
assesses directly the impact of incentives to early retirement on youth unem-
ployment. This strategy involves two steps. The ﬁ  rst one is to build indicators 
that measure the intensity of these incentives. This step is presented in sec-
tion 4.4.1. Once this has been done, these indicators are used as explanatory 
variables for labor market outcomes of the diﬀerent age groups in section 
4.4.2. This second strategy is not without ﬂ  aws, either. In the case of France, 
we show that the incentives are themselves endogenous; that is, they have 
been put in place at times of rising unemployment. This means that a causal 
interpretation of our results remains problematic. The conclusion will come 
back to the general interpretation of our results.
4.2      Background: Debates and Policies
The aim of this section is to present a brief history of the development of 
early retirement in France, with speciﬁ  c attention to the role played by labor 
market considerations in debates that have accompanied this trend.
Several factors have converged in favor of these policies. The aspiration 
of workers or labor unions to early retirement has naturally played a strong 
role; it was the continuation of the ﬁ  ght against “work alienation.” In the 
1970s, a campaign slogan of the CGT (Confédération Générale du Travail), 
a communist-  inspired union, was thus “Better Retired than Unemployed” 
(Guillemard 1983). In 1997, four years after the ﬁ  rst reform that tried to 
increase the normal retirement age, the CGT union still oﬃcially favored the 
ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve-  year-  old retirement age for everyone, in particular with the goal to 
lower unemployment. According to a poll released at the time in the daily 
newspaper Le Monde, 61 percent of French people were in favor of “the 55 
retirement age in order to lower unemployment.”1 Surveys on the percep-
tion of early retirement by employees also showed that if the ﬁ  rst reason for 
accepting early retirement was the wish to stop working, many employees 
stated the need to leave jobs for the young as a clear motivation for their 
choice (Caussat and Roth 1997). The attraction for early retirement still 
remains relatively high in France compared to other countries, according to 
some results from the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe 
(SHARE; Blanchet and Debrand 2008).
But employers and governments have also played a large role in the de-
velopment of this “culture of early exit,” to use an expression coined by 
Guillemard (2003). Employers saw these early exits as a way to facilitate 
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the restructuring of old industries or to solve their problems of excess labor 
capacity. As far as governments are concerned, these early retirement poli-
cies have been one dimension of a global Malthusian answer to labor market 
problems, based on the idea that the total amount of work is constrained, so 
unemployment is just the result of an unequal distribution of work. In this 
context, work sharing appeared to be a good way to lower unemployment, 
either within cohorts (working-  time reduction) or between cohorts (early 
retirement or longer studies). The idea that work sharing was a solution to 
unemployment problems was also supported by books like The End of Work 
(Rifkin 1996), which topped the best seller list in France in the 1990s. This 
general orientation has been common to right-  wing and left-  leaning gov-
ernments, the only diﬀerence concerning the choice of instruments: conser-
vative governments favored policies excluding women or immigrants from 
the labor force and subsidizing employers for early retirement; left-  leaning 
governments favored lowering hours of work or lowering the age of normal 
retirement.
We shall examine how all these policies have been implemented, with a 
speciﬁ  c focus on policies that have applied to wage earners in the private 
sector, who represent the majority of the population. These workers tradi-
tionally beneﬁ  t from a basic pension delivered by the “general regime” and 
from one or two complementary beneﬁ  ts delivered by two complementary 
schemes—ARRCO (Association pour le Régime de Retraite Complémentaire 
des Salariés) and AGIRC (Association Générale des Institutions de Retraite 
des Cadres)—the second one being speciﬁ  c to highly skilled white-  collar 
workers. Besides these two or three forms of “normal” beneﬁ  ts, many of 
these workers have beneﬁ  ted during the same period from the emergence and 
consolidation of various forms of early or pre-  retirement schemes.
To make the presentation easier to follow, we shall distinguish three main 
phases, identiﬁ  ed on ﬁ  gure 4.1, which gives the evolution of global stocks 
of retired or pre-  retired people for the ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four age group by 
broad categories:
•   The ﬁ   rst phase is a phase of increased generosity of normal pension 
beneﬁ  ts, with a normal age of retirement that remained equal to sixty-
 ﬁ  v e,  b u t  a c c o m p a n i e d  b y  t h e  p r o g r e s s i v e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  p r e -  r e t i r e m e n t  
schemes for the sixty to sixty-  four age group. This period lasted until 
the end of the 1970s.
•    The second period is a period of acceleration of these early exits: ﬁ  rst 
through the expansion of pre-  retirement between sixty and sixty-  four, 
then through the lowering of the normal retirement age to sixty (1983 
reform), and last by the development of new pre-  retirement routes 
that have extended the phenomenon to the ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to ﬁ  fty-  nine age 
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•    The third phase is one of relative stabilization, with a combination of 
closure or resorption of some schemes, partly compensated by the de-
velopment of other ones, accompanied with two pension reforms that 
have started paving the way for future increases in the normal retirement 
age—the 1993 and 2003 reforms.
4.2.1      The Seventies: More Generous Pensions at 
Sixty-  Five and Development of Pre-  Retirement 
for the Sixty to Sixty-  Four Age Group
Before 1971, the “general regime” oﬀered a pension that at best was 40 
percent of a reference wage, which was the average of past wages computed 
on the ten last years of one’s career. This level was proposed at age sixty- ﬁ  ve. 
A reduction/bonus of 10 percent per missing/additional year of age was 
applied to this pension level. For mortality conditions of the period, such 
an adjustment was not very far from actuarial neutrality.
The Boulin Law in 1971 has been the main change that has occurred over 
the period for this general regime; it increased the global generosity of the 
system. The normal replacement rate was raised from 40 percent to 50 per-
cent, and the reference wage started to be computed over the ten best years 
of one’s career rather than the ten last ones. At this stage, the motivation was 
not at all to encourage earlier exits. It was essentially to reduce the income 
gap between workers and retirees. No strong change occurred concerning 
retirement age; the normal age remained sixty-  ﬁ  ve, with the same bonuses/
penalties for postponement/anticipation.
Fig. 4.1    Social security and early retirement programs (1973 to 2002)124        Melika Ben Salem, Didier Blanchet, Antoine Bozio, and Muriel Roger
2. The unemployment insurance is ﬁ  nanced and managed by unions and employers.
In this context, retirement before sixty-  ﬁ  ve took two routes. The ﬁ  rst one 
was the opportunity to leave and get a normal retirement as soon as sixty in 
the general regime for speciﬁ  c categories of people, such as veterans, blue-
  collar working mothers, and so forth.
The second one has been the progressive development of pre-  retirement 
schemes. It was in 1963 that such early retirement policies ﬁ  rst appeared 
in France with the creation of the National Job Fund (Fond National pour 
l’Emploi, FNE) and with the associated beneﬁ  t (ASFNE). This scheme pro-
vided a replacement rate of 80 percent to 90 percent of the previous net 
wage. It started as a very speciﬁ  c program but became more massive in the 
seventies when the steel industry underwent massive restructuring, aﬀecting 
entire areas in the north of France. The fund was completely ﬁ  nanced by 
the government. It must be mentioned that at the outset, this scheme did 
not really respond to workers’ will to retire early. Early dismissal of workers 
belonging to declining industries was often seen by these workers as a form 
of denial of their social utility and therefore not welcomed by them. And the 
idea of using this policy to ﬁ  ght global unemployment was not dominant, 
either. The question was more sector speciﬁ  c, and this policy was considered 
transitory. The idea was just to lower the social cost of restructuring older 
industries. The scheme remained targeted to these regions and limited to 
collective layoﬀs.
The early retirement policy for the steel industry was further strengthened 
in 1972 with the creation of the CGPS (Convention Générale de Protection de 
la Sidérurgie), extending pre- retirement to wage earners as young as ﬁ  fty. In 
the meantime, other sectors had started making large use of early exits, such 
as the automobile and textile industries, as a way to reduce their workforce 
and/or automate their production chains. A consensus was reached between 
unions and employers that led UNEDIC (Union Nationale Interprofession-
nelle pour l’Emploi dans l’Industrie et le Commerce, the unemployment insur-
ance2) to provide an early retirement scheme (garantie de ressources, GR) on 
a large scale. The program was ﬁ  rst limited to layoﬀs (Garantie de Ressources 
Licenciement, GRL). It was targeted to the sixty to sixty- ﬁ  ve age group. The 
replacement rate was 70 percent of the previous gross wage, thus higher than 
a full-  rate pension.
It is over this period that the idea of using early exits to facilitate access to 
employment for younger workers took importance. As unemployment rose 
in the 1970s due to macroeconomic shocks, collective layoﬀs appeared more 
and more socially diﬃcult to accept, and early retirement policies developed 
at a considerable rate. A consensus favored these policies as a good way to 
reduce unemployment. The evolution of the garantie de ressources is the 
best testimony of this change. Initially limited to layoﬀs in 1972, it was 
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Ressources Démission, GRD), with the explicit ambition of reducing unem-
ployment for the young. The preamble of the 1977 agreement clearly states, 
“All the parties signing this agreement expect the release of jobs allowing 
many unemployed to ﬁ  nd jobs.”
4.2.2      The Early 1980s: Lowering of the Normal Retirement Age 
and a New Phase of Expansion for Pre-  Retirement
The development of these policies was also inﬂ  uenced by the desire to 
win votes in forthcoming elections.3 For example, in 1980, just before the 
1981 presidential election, the right-  wing government in oﬃce reactivated 
the old ASFNE scheme, extending it to wage earners ﬁ  fty- six years and two 
months old, and even ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve by derogation. This tendency was continued 
by the Socialist government that took over in 1981. Between June 1982 and 
December 1983, the CSPRD (Contrat de Solidarité préretraite démission) 
scheme oﬀered a replacement rate of 70 percent of the gross wage to wage 
earners older than ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve with more than ten years of contribution who 
had resigned. The objective of a one- for- one substitution of senior workers 
by younger ones was explicitly stated, conditional on the ﬁ  rm maintain-
ing its staﬀ constant, hiring in priority young workers under twenty-  six, 
lonely women, or unemployed people.4 Announcing the scheme in Lille—
the north of France that had been particularly hit by massive restructuring 
in manufacturing—the French prime minister of the time, Pierre Mauroy, 
asked the older workers to accept this scheme: “And I would like to speak 
to the elders, to those who have spent their lifetime working in this region, 
and well, I would like them to show the way, that life must change; when it 
is time to retire, leave the labor force in order to provide jobs for your sons 
and daughters. That is what I ask you. The Government makes it possible for 
you to retire at age 55. Then retire, with one’s head held high, proud of your 
worker’s life. This is what we are going to ask you. . . . This is the “contrat 
de solidarité.” That those who are the oldest, those who have worked, leave 
the labor force, release jobs so that everyone can have a job.”5
This CSPRD scheme has been the victim of its large success. In less than a 
year, more than 200,000 people retired through this scheme, which led to its 
closing (for cost reasons) one year later in December 1983, with intentions 
of returning to a more rigorous policy. But in the meantime, the govern-
ment had decided to fulﬁ  ll one of its electoral promises—retirement at age 
sixty. This measure was taken in a context that was temporarily favorable 
3. Even if governments might have been convinced that early retirement was not eﬀective in 
the long run, they might have used these schemes as way to secure a short-  term reduction in 
the unemployment rate.
4. This scheme is very similar to the job release scheme implemented in the United Kingdom 
since 1977 (see chapter 11 in this volume), except that the level beneﬁ  t—earnings related—was 
much more generous, particularly for high-  wage earners.
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for the general regime. The age group depleted by low birth rates during the 
First World War (i.e., born between 1915 and 1919) had started retiring in 
1980. During a few years, the number of pensioners decreased, lowering the 
demographic ratio and generating surpluses in the pension system. The idea, 
therefore, was to seize this opportunity for a switch of the burden of early 
retirement from unemployment insurance (UNEDIC), which suﬀered from 
large deﬁ  cits, to the pension system.
Formally, this 1983 reform did not change the minimum retirement age 
that was already equal to sixty before the reform.6 The point was that leav-
ing at this age initially implied a very high penalty, with a replacement rate 
of only 25 percent. The reform removed this penalty, allowing a 50 percent 
replacement rate at sixty, conditional on 37.5 years of contribution (with 
an unchanged penalty for those not fulﬁ  lling this condition). Contrary to 
early retirement schemes that were targeted, albeit imperfectly, toward the 
less- qualiﬁ   ed workers, the 1983 reform was a general incentive to early retire-
ment, given the fact that a large majority of people fulﬁ  lled this condition 
at sixty—at least among men.
The debate in 1983 around this lowering of the retirement age (from 
sixty- ﬁ   ve  to  sixty)  made  clear  once  again  that  the  goal  of  the  reform  was  to 
release jobs for the young as well as to provide more leisure for the elderly. 
The best illustration of this is the fact that the reform not only increased 
the replacement rate but also discouraged the pursuit of work at older ages. 
In particular, increases in the pension rate were not possible once you had 
reached the “full rate.”7 The law stated that “the goal is to allow the grant of 
a full pension but not to encourage the pursuit of work after age 65.”8 The 
possibility to work while having a pension was also restricted in the hope that 
new pensioners would actually leave jobs for the young.9 The Employment 
Ministry of the time presented the reform as a success: “The lowering of 
the retirement age strengthens the positive eﬀects on employment that early 
retirement policies made possible. It even widens these positive eﬀects as a 
large share of the population is concerned.”10
These changes have been accompanied by changes in rules governing 
complementary pensions. These complementary pensions are computed 
according to a system that has some resemblance to the principle of notional 
accounts: contributions are used to buy “points,” and the total number of 
6. Technically, this reform was only for men, as women already had the opportunity to retire 
at age sixty, with full rate provided after 37.5 years of contribution. Women, however, were 
much less likely to fulﬁ  ll this condition.
7. The only remaining way to increase its pension level was through an increase in the refer-
ence wage; that is, for employees with increasing wages after age sixty.
8. Preamble of the Ordonnance from March 26, 1982.
9. The Ordonnance from March 1982 restricted the work of pensioners. They were required 
to quit the ﬁ  rm where they were previously working and pay an additional tax to unemployment 
insurance. This tax was removed by the law of January 27, 1987.
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points accumulated during one’s career is converted into a pension level 
at retirement, with, until 1965, a quasi-  actuarial adjustment according to 
retirement age. In 1965, the bonus for postponement had been suppressed 
for people retiring beyond sixty-  ﬁ  ve but the penalty maintained for retire-
ment before sixty-  ﬁ  ve. In 1983, this penalty itself was fully removed for 
people retiring from the general regime with the full rate, reinforcing the 
incentive to retire at sixty for these people.
4.2.3      Since the mid-  1980s: Changes and Continuity
The 1983 reform was expected to lead to the extinction of early retirement 
schemes for the sixty to sixty- four age bracket.11 It was also expected that no 
further development of pre-  retirement would take place. The government 
now wanted to avoid the development of similar amounts of early exits 
upstream the new retirement age of sixty (i.e., in the ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to ﬁ  fty-  nine 
age bracket). Now that the normal retirement age had been lowered, pre-
  retirement was expected to play no more than a marginal role.
But this objective has not been fulﬁ  lled, given the continued pressure in 
favor of early retirement. The following story has been a story of permanent 
tension between the will to restrict early exits and the necessity to cope with 
employers’ and employees’ common interest in favor of early retirement. 
Evolutions that took place over this period can be classiﬁ  ed according to 
whether they favored early exits or tried to limit them.
The main new evolution favoring early exits over this period has been the 
expansion of the unemployment insurance route. This essentially took place 
by the creation of the DRE (Dispense de recherche d’emploi) that was intro-
duced in 1985.12 The system exempts unemployed people from job seeking 
past a certain age (ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve at its creation) and oﬀers them nondegressive 
beneﬁ  ts until they become entitled to a full-  rate pension. One impact of 
this system has been to arithmetically lower the unemployment rate in the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) sense of the term, since the ILO 
deﬁ  nition considers job seeking as a necessary condition for being counted 
as unemployed, and this system is quasi-  equivalent to pre-  retirement, even 
if it oﬀers replacement rates that are generally less generous than those 
provided by pre-  retirement schemes stricto sensu. The unemployed who are 
exempted from job seeking can currently receive three diﬀerent forms of 
beneﬁ  ts: the ASS (allocation de solidarité spéciﬁ  que) provides an unemploy-
ment beneﬁ  t 50 percent higher for those ﬁ  fty- ﬁ  ve and older who have at least 
ten years of contribution; the ACA (allocation chômeurs âgés) is targeted at 
the unemployed with forty years of contribution; and the AER (allocation 
équivalent retraite) is a means-  tested additional beneﬁ  t. In the 1990s, the 
11. The switch was progressively done, because GR schemes were more generous than SS 
provisions, so most early retirees remained in the scheme until age sixty-  ﬁ  ve.
12. Again, this scheme was implemented just before the 1986 parliamentary elections.128        Melika Ben Salem, Didier Blanchet, Antoine Bozio, and Muriel Roger
DRE became numerically more important than early retirees. A regulation 
of this system through ﬁ  nancial penalties on layoﬀs of older workers was 
attempted (the Delalande contributions) but with limited success (Behaghel, 
Crépon, and Sedillot 2005).
On the other side, we have seen the progressive closing of schemes that 
existed at the beginning of the period and their replacement by new schemes 
that have been increasingly short-  lived and/or more targeted. We have 
already mentioned the complete closing of the CSPRD in 1983 and the 
progressive extinction of the garantie de ressources. A reduction of ASFNE 
beneﬁ  ts also took place. The initial replacement rate of the ASFNE, which 
was originally 70 percent, was reduced in 1982 to 65 percent under the social 
security (SS) ceiling13 and to 50 percent between one and two ceilings. In 
1994, this scheme was restricted to wage earners older than ﬁ  fty-  seven. It is 
now becoming progressively extinct.
The alternative pre-  retirement schemes that have been created over the 
period to replace the former schemes have had much narrower targets. One 
example is the ARPE (allocation de remplacement pour l’emploi) scheme 
created in 1995, targeted at wage earners older than ﬁ  fty-  eight with at least 
forty years of contribution. The ARPE beneﬁ  t provided a replacement 
rate of 65 percent of gross wage of the last twelve months.14 The idea of 
encouraging youth employment was still present in this scheme; employ-
ers using the ARPE were compelled to replace early retirees by younger 
workers, especially under age twenty- six. In the case of no new hiring, ﬁ  rms 
had to reimburse the unemployment insurance. The ARPE itself was sup-
pressed after ﬁ  ve years of existence and replaced in 2000 by the still more 
focused CATS (cessation d’activité de certains travailleurs salariés) and 
CAATA (cessation anticipée d’activité des travailleurs de l’amiante). The 
CATS scheme is targeted at workers who had especially diﬃcult working 
conditions (at least ﬁ  fteen years on an assembly line or with night work). 
The minimum age is ﬁ  fty-  seven, although this condition can be lowered to 
ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve for certain sectors. The beneﬁ  t is 65 percent of gross wage under 
the SS ceiling and 50 percent between one and two ceilings. The CAATA 
scheme targets workers exposed to asbestos; the beneﬁ  t is computed as in 
the CATS scheme.
The other major change in the direction of later exits took place at the 
level of the pension scheme itself, with the two reforms enacted in 1993 and 
2003.
The 1993 reform has aﬀected incentives to retire in two ways. One way is 
by the reduction of pension levels at the full rate: instead of being computed 
on the ten best years of one’s career, the reference wage is progressively 
13. This threshold represents approximately the average wage in France.
14. Similarly, the CFA (Congé de ﬁ  n d’activite) has also existed in the public sector, provid-
ing a replacement rate of 75 percent to civil servants older than ﬁ  fty-  eight with forty years of 
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computed on a longer period, up to twenty-  ﬁ  ve years for people born in 
1948 or after. Coupled with less generous revalorization rules for these past 
wages, this is expected to have a strong long-  run impact on pension levels. 
The second way is by the strengthening of the conditions required to get the 
full pension: it has progressively increased from 37.5 to forty years by one 
quarter each year.
As far as the retirement age is concerned, this 1993 reform remained sym-
bolic, given that a large share of cohorts currently retiring go on fulﬁ  lling the 
new condition of forty years of past contributions. This led to the proposal 
of further strengthening this condition at the end of the 1990s (Charpin 
1999), and this has been the main axis of the 2003 reform. For cohorts 
born between 1944 and 1948, the condition will temporarily remain ﬁ  xed 
at forty years: this period has been used for organizing a convergence by 
public sector employees who are not concerned by the 1993 reform and for 
whom the condition has remained equal to 37.5. But starting in 2008, the 
progression of this condition starts again in the private sector: it is planned 
to be forty-  one for the 1952 cohort and then to increase parallel with life 
expectancy, the progression now going at the same speed in the private and 
public sectors. Simultaneously, and still according to proposals from the 
Charpin report, the 2003 reform also changed the structure of incentives 
around the full rate: the penalty for early retirement has been reduced, and 
the bonus for postponement that had been suppressed in 1983 has been 
reintroduced, albeit at a lower level. After stabilization, the penalty should 
be 5 percent per year missing and the bonus equal to 3 percent per year of 
postponement. All this brings the rule closer but not strictly equivalent to 
actuarial neutrality.
4.2.4      Where Do We Stand? The Current State of 
Ideas Concerning Early Retirement
Which preliminary conclusions can we draw from this rapid examina-
tion?
Concerning trends, the main message is that the “golden age” of early 
retirement expansion essentially lasted until the mid-  1980s. We will use this 
period to test the impact of this policy on labor market outcomes. After this 
period, France has at best been able to stabilize the employment rate for its 
senior workers. Some steps in the direction of reincreasing the retirement 
age have been made by the 1993 reform (Bozio 2008), and more signiﬁ  cantly 
by the 2003 reform, but the eﬀects will be progressive at best and cannot be 
observed at this stage.
Concerning the evolution of opinions on the retirement/labor market re-
lationship, the idea that Malthusian policies are an eﬃcient answer to labor 
market disequilibrium has signiﬁ  cantly lost ground. This applies both to 
early retirement policies and to other Malthusian policies such as working-
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the retirement age is the proper long- run solution to increased longevity has 
become widespread.
The point where dissensus remains more important concerns the facility 
of implementing such a policy in a context of high unemployment with 
especially low labor demand for senior workers.
At one extreme of the spectrum, the idea that it is nonsense to try to 
increase the age of retirement when unemployment is high remains preg-
nant. Just to quote one example, A. Lipietz, both a politician and econo-
mist, expressed in Le Monde in 1993 his opposition to proposals from a 
report (Commissariat Général du Plan 1991) that advised the increase of 
the required length of contribution: “The reduction of active life, which 
was an eﬀective tool to reduce unemployment will be blocked. With a con-
stant macroeconomic situation, each ‘non out going’ from the labor market 
will be immediately matched with a ‘non in coming,’ either an unemployed 
remaining unemployed or a young student becoming unemployed.” This 
statement is now a bit dated but would probably continue to be shared by 
many observers or actors.
At the other extreme of the spectrum, some authors argue that this high 
unemployment rate is precisely the consequence of early retirement poli-
cies. A recent report from the Conseil d’Analyse Economique (D’Autume, 
Betbeze, and Hairault 2005) defends that view and argues that a stronger 
revision of incentives for early retirement could very well improve rather 
than deteriorate the employment situation of older workers: it would simply 
lengthen the horizon on which people plan the end of their active lives, 
restore their incitation to seek employment when they are unemployed, and 
contribute to restoring their employability from the point of view of employ-
ers. All this could take place without negative eﬀects on other segments of 
the labor force, since there are little substitution eﬀects between age groups 
on this labor market.
Somewhere in between, we can have the view that changes in the retire-
ment age are indeed neutral for unemployment rates in the long run but not 
necessarily so in the short run. The long-  run neutrality is warranted by the 
fact that changes in the retirement age only change the scale of the labor 
market, without impinging on its properties. But this does not necessarily 
warrant “superneutrality,” (i.e., a complete absence of the impact of changes 
in the growth rate of labor supply). If we do not have such superneutrality, 
there is indeed a problem of appropriate timing for increasing the retirement 
age. Can we start this policy before having returned to full employment, or 
should we wait until full employment has been restored?
Current evolutions of the unemployment rate are not contradictory with 
this concern: the unemployment rate has been declining again in France 
since 2005, and many observers argue that this is partly the result of the 
fact that large cohorts of baby boomers have begun to retire. Increasing too 
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slow down or even revert this process, at least for some time. This view is 
also consistent with quite a wide range of models of the labor market. This 
diﬀerentiation between short-  run and long-  run eﬀects was already present 
in macroeconometric analysis of the impact of pre- retirement that had been 
performed during the 1990s (DARES 1996). It is conﬁ  rmed by more recent 
explorations of alternative modelings of the consequences of demographic 
changes on unemployment (Ouvrard and Rathelot 2006).
At this stage, the question turns out to be an empirical one. We need to 
evaluate exactly what have been the consequences of these past policies, and 
this is what we shall try to do in the rest of this chapter.
4.3      Labor Force Participation for Older Workers 
and Labor Market Outcomes
We shall start our empirical examination with a simple visual examina-
tion of the links between these major policy changes and employment of 
older workers and a simple regression analysis of how these changes in older 
worker rates of employment did or did not aﬀect labor market outcomes for 
other workers. One limit of this approach will be the fact that changes in LFP 
rates for senior workers do not only reﬂ  ect the impact of retirement policies; 
they are also inﬂ  uenced by general labor market conditions. Controlling for 
the economic cycle will be one way to minimize this bias.
4.3.1    A  Visual  Examination
Time series of employment or unemployment rates have been provided by 
the Labor Force Survey (LFS) conducted by the French National Statistical 
Institute (INSEE) since 1950. We use the 1968 to 2005 waves of this LFS. 
From 1968 to 2002, the households included in the Labor Force Survey 
sample are interviewed in March of three consecutive years, with one-  third 
of the households replaced each year. The French Labor Force Survey thus 
presents a break in the series in 2003 resulting from the transition from 
an annual to a continuous survey.15 Since 2003, the households included 
in the French LFS have been interviewed in six consecutive quarters, with 
one-  sixth of the households replaced each quarter. The survey samples are 
representative of the French population aged ﬁ  fteen and up. Education and 
labor market status are completed for each interview.
Trends in labor force participation, employment, unemployment, and 
school attendance by age are given in ﬁ  gures 4.2 and 4.3. The rates are 
deﬁ  ned as the number of active, employed, unemployed, or in-  school indi-
viduals in an age group divided by the total number of individuals in this 
age group. Age groups are the following: youth from twenty to twenty-  four 
15. The dummy variable introduced in the regressions to ﬁ  x the problem was never signiﬁ  -
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years old, prime age from twenty-  ﬁ  ve to ﬁ  fty-  four, and seniors from ﬁ  fty-
 ﬁ  v e   t o   s i x t y -  ﬁ  v e.
Participation rates of senior workers are quite low and are decreasing over 
the period, with a trend change at the end of the period due to the boom 
of the late 1990s. Until 1982, the decrease corresponds to a period of early 
retirement policies. The year 1982 marks a change in policy with the decrease 
in the retirement age.
Fig. 4.2    Labor force participation of old workers and unemployment
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The unemployment rate rose in France during the 1970s and 1980s in all 
age groups, and particularly for the young, with a peak in the beginning of 
the 1980s. The trend reverses after that. When considering ﬁ  gure 4.3, we see 
that the employment rate of the twenty to twenty- four age group is decreas-
ing over nearly the whole period, except for a small increase in the beginning 
of the twenty-  ﬁ  rst century. The decrease in the youth unemployment rate is 
due to a massive increase in the school rate and not to a greater employment 
rate of young workers. The shape of the employment rate of young people 
is the exact opposite of the one of the school participation rate.
Concerning prime age workers, the employment rate has been quite stable 
over the period. The stability of the employment rate, despite massive unem-
ployment, has to be linked with the increase of female labor participation.
4.3.2    Some  Regression  Results
To study the long-  term relationship between labor force participation of 
the old and employment of the young, we will ﬁ  rst present the results of 
simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. The sample period for our 
yearly data goes from 1968 to 2005. We consider ﬁ  ve dependent variables: 
the unemployment rate, the employment rate and the school attendance 
for young people, and the unemployment and employment rates for prime 
age workers. The parameter of interest is the coeﬃcient of the labor force 
participation of old workers. Estimations are conducted in levels but also 
in three-  year lags and ﬁ  ve-  year diﬀerences. Two sets of estimations have 
been made. In the ﬁ  rst one, covariates included are gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita, its growth rate, and the share of this GDP generated by 
manufacturing. In the second one, we add the mean school leaving age. 
Results are given in tables 4.1 and 4.2.
The ﬁ  rst half of table 4.1 shows that direct estimation of the correlation, 
without controlling for general labor market conditions, suggests a nega-
tive link between senior LFP and youth unemployment and a positive link 
with youth employment. It also depresses the young’s tendency to remain 
in school. All this goes more or less in the same direction of weakening the 
Malthusian view: a higher activity rate for senior workers stimulates the 
insertion of younger people into the labor market.
If we now turn to the case of prime age workers, we observe some diﬀer-
ences. We still have a negative relationship between senior LFP and the unem-
ployment rate of these prime age workers—once again an anti-  Malthusian 
result. But the correlation with these prime age workers’ employment rate 
is also negative. In other words, a lower senior LFP has the paradoxical 
eﬀect of simultaneously increasing the probability to be employed and the 
probability to be unemployed for a prime age worker. The explanation of 
this paradox is probably in the increase of female labor force participation 
over the period.
In any event, once controls are included, many of these correlations van-134        Melika Ben Salem, Didier Blanchet, Antoine Bozio, and Muriel Roger
ish, the coeﬃcients of senior LFP becoming generally insigniﬁ  cant, as shown 
in the second half of table 4.1. Nevertheless, those coeﬃcients that remain 
signiﬁ  cant go on supporting the anti-  Malthusian view that a high senior 
LFP is good news rather than bad new for other groups of workers. But 
controlling for output poses a number of problems. First, we are interested 
in the unconditional relationship between young and old employment, so 
any estimation controlling for GDP will remain unsatisfactory. Next, even if 
we were only interested in this conditional relationship, it is hard to pretend 
that our controls perfectly account for changes in labor demand. From these 
time series regressions, it is impossible to exclude the possibility that some 
simultaneity issue is not at play here.
There is a further issue when looking at youth employment rates, particu-
larly striking in the case of France, and that is the role of education policies, 
which have dramatically aﬀected the situation of people in the ﬁ  fteen to 
twenty-  four age group, as was shown in ﬁ  gure 4.3. To check whether this 
factor aﬀects our results, we have made a second set of regressions, presented 
in table 4.2. This table is comparable to the second half of table 4.1 but 
Table 4.1  Direct relationship between the elderly labor force participation and the employment 
and unemployment of young and prime age persons
Youth, 20 to 24 Prime age, 25 to 54
    Unemployment   Employment   School   Unemployment   Employment
No controls
Levels –0.742 1.723 –1.486 –0.480 –0.250
(0.062) (0.165) (0.170) (0.030) (0.034)
Three- year  lag 
on elderly 
employment
–0.492 1.783 –1.683 –0.457 –0.185
(0.090) (0.136) (0.141) (0.024) (0.031)
Five- year 
diﬀerence
–0.606 0.790 –0.208 –0.208 0.049
(0.003) (0.199) (0.198) (0.051) (0.039)
Five- year  log 
diﬀerence
–2.202 0.830 –0.502 –1.909 0.034
(0.457) (0.236) (0.265) (0.466) (0.022)
With controls
Levels –0.371 1.182 –1.080 –0.316 –0.080
(0.246) (0.566) (0.677) (0.108) (0.097)
Three- year  lag 
on elderly 
employment
0.161 1.433 –1.845 –0.345 –0.054
(0.124) (0.222) (0.255) (0.048) (0.046)
Five- year 
diﬀerence
–0.455 0.116 0.348 –0.053 0.016
(0.184) (0.229) (0.225) (0.045) (0.061)
Five- year  log 
diﬀerence
 –1.297 0.148 0.535 –0.152 0.011
(1.119)   (0.227)   (0.370)   (0.714)   (0.038)
Notes: Reported is the coeﬃcient of elderly labor force participation. Controls are GDP per capita, 
growth of GDP per capita, and the proportion of GDP generated by manufacturing. Three-  year lag 
means that we regress the dependent variable on a three-  year lag of elderly employment. Five-  year dif-
ference means that we take ﬁ  fth diﬀerences for the right-   and left-  hand sides. Five-  year log diﬀerence 
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with the mean age at leaving school used as an additional control variable. 
Results do not dramatically change compared to those of the ﬁ  rst approach. 
Coeﬃcients obtained after controlling for this school- leaving age are gener-
ally less signiﬁ  cant than before controls, but when they are, they generally 
go on supporting the non- Malthusian view that senior workers and workers 
from other age groups are complements rather than substitutes.
4.4      Measuring Changes in Retirement Incentives
Even when controlling for various determinants of general unemploy-
ment, the approach followed in the previous section is diﬃcult to interpret 
in terms of a causal impact of early retirement policies on employment 
rates of younger workers. Let’s assume that some unobserved factors can 
have simultaneous impacts on the unemployment of younger workers and 
on labor force participation of older workers, these impacts being a priori 
of opposite signs. In principle, this will imply that periods of low labor 
force participation for older workers will also tend to be periods of high 
unemployment for younger ones. Let’s also assume that a causal impact of 
retirement policies on youth unemployment actually exists and is of positive 
sign—that is, accelerating exits from the labor force by senior workers helps 
in lowering unemployment for younger workers. In such a context, the two 
relationships will oﬀset each other, and the true beneﬁ  ts of early retirement 
policies on youth unemployment will be underestimated.
The ideal way to deal with these problems would be by instrumenting LFP 
Table 4.2  Direct relationship between the elderly labor force participation and the employment 
and unemployment of young and prime age persons, control by the mean school 
leaving age
Youth, 20 to 24 Prime age, 25 to 54
    Unemployment   Employment   Unemployment   Employment
With controls
Levels –0.513 0.213 –0.103 –0.001
(–0.274) (0.399) (0.057) (0.104)
Three-  year lag on 
elderly employment
0.072 0.243 –0.120 0.070
(0.177) (0.259) (0.036) (0.043)
Five- year  diﬀerence –0.381 0.338 –0.071 0.070
(0.178) (0.182) (0.041) (0.038)
Five-  year log diﬀerence –0.329 0.325 0.300 0.041
  (0.801)   (0.207)   (0.645)   (0.023)
Notes: Reported is the coeﬃcient of elderly labor force participation. Controls are GDP per capita, 
growth of GDP per capita, the proportion of GDP generated by manufacturing, and the mean school 
leaving age. Three-  year lag means that we regress the dependent variable on a three-  year lag of elderly 
employment. Five-  year diﬀerence means that we take ﬁ  fth diﬀer-ences for the right-   and left-  hand sides. 
Five-  year log diﬀerence means that we take the log of each X and Y variable, then take ﬁ  ve-  year diﬀer-
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rates of older workers with a variable that explains this labor force participa-
tion but that cannot be suspected of being endogenous to the global situa-
tion of the labor market. If policies had been decided completely indepen-
dently from this labor market situation, an index summarizing the intensity 
of such policies would do the job. We shall actually look at the impact of 
such an index on labor market outcomes for the diﬀerent age groups. But we 
know in advance that the exogeneity assumption is doubtful in the French 
case. Policies encouraging early exits have been at least partly motivated by 
the labor market situation, as seen in section 4.2. We shall therefore adopt 
a more agnostic strategy, looking at the possibility of reciprocal causation 
between policies and these labor market variables, relying on Granger cau-
sality tests.
The next subsection will present the method used for computing our indi-
cator of the incentives to retire. Regression results and Granger causality 
tests will be presented in the subsequent one.
4.4.1    Incentive  Measures
The purpose of this subsection is to translate the qualitative descriptions 
of section 4.2 into quantitative measures of the intensity of policies aimed 
at accelerating exits from the labor force by older workers. Among the many 
diﬃculties of such an exercise, one stems from the intrinsic complexity of 
the French system, which combines many diﬀerent regulations applying 
to diﬀerent categories of workers: wage earners in the private sector, civil 
servants, workers from large public ﬁ  rms (the so-  called régimes spéciaux), 
or self- employed. As we did in section 4.2, we shall here bypass this element 
of complexity by concentrating on the case of wage earners in the private 
sector, for two reasons: these workers represent the large majority of the 
labor force (60 percent to 70 percent), and it is for this category of workers 
that the major changes occurred throughout the period.
As far as normal retirement is concerned, wage earners in the private 
sector are covered by one basic scheme (the regime général) and one or 
two complementary schemes—ARRCO and AGIRC—the latter being spe-
ciﬁ  c to highly qualiﬁ  ed workers (cadres). Section 4.2 mentioned the major 
reforms that have been applied to the régime général during the period under 
review. Our analysis takes these reforms into account and also the associated 
changes in complementary schemes. Concerning access to pre- retirement, a 
one- by- one inclusion of all the possibilities that have existed over the period 
is beyond the scope of this chapter and would probably be of little interest, 
given the very aggregate nature of the index we are trying to build. The 
strategy has been instead to proxy all these routes by the dominant one for 
each period, giving to this route a global weight equal to the total ﬂ  ow of 
early retirees for each period.
Computations are made by gender, whatever the cohort, with a wage per-
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of services. Results are averaged over the subgroups. Assuming a career at 
the SS ceiling is close to assuming a “median” career, since the social security 
ceiling changed more or less in phase with the average wage.
Figure 4.4 presents results in terms of social security wealth (SSW), 
depending on age and time at retirement. It actually gives a good view of 
the main changes observed since the end of the 1960s. The SSW series has a 
general upward trend reﬂ  ecting general economic growth. Under pre-  1971 
conditions, we have a strong progressivity of the pension level as a function 
of age. The 1971 reform leads to a strong jump. The jump is higher for people 
retiring around sixty, especially in 1972, due to transitory constraints on the 
maximum pension level that minimized the beneﬁ  t of the reform for people 
retiring late. On the whole, the gap between pension levels reached between 
sixty and sixty-  ﬁ  ve remains rather large. The 1983 reform leads to an inver-
sion of the relative position of the diﬀerent curves: the reason is because 
oﬀering the same replacement rate at sixty and sixty-  ﬁ  ve means oﬀering a 
higher SSW at sixty than at sixty- ﬁ  ve, due to the fact that the expected length 
of the retirement period is longer at sixty than at sixty-  ﬁ  ve. The opposite 
was true before 1983, due to the overactuarial magnitude of the penalty that 
applied before this date to people retiring before sixty-  ﬁ  ve.
The next step is to try combining this series into a single summary indica-
tor. Let W(a, y) represent the social security wealth of a person retiring at 
age a in year y. Let q(a, y) represent the probability of facing such an incen-
tive at this period and at this age; that is, the probability of still not being 
retired and of being entitled to such a beneﬁ  t. Before the ﬁ  rst eligibility 
age of sixty, this probability will be zero. After sixty, it will be 1 minus the 
share of people already retired; that is, 1 – p(a, y). Given these elements, the 
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aggregation strategy averages past incentives W(a, y) over the current stock 
of retirees, since what we want to measure is the cumulative eﬀect of past 
incentives on current LFP rates of people over sixty. The global index that 
provides this aggregation is:
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where the second bracket synthesizes past incentives faced by people cur-
rently retired at age a, which are then averaged over all groups of people 
currently retired, with ages comprised between ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve and sixty-  ﬁ  ve.
This aggregate indicator is provided in ﬁ  gure 4.5. It essentially captures 
the strong impact of the 1983 reform in favor of an earlier retirement.
We have also explored another version of the incentive measure, built not 
only on the expected social security wealth for retiring at a given age but also 
on the diﬀerence between the social security wealth derived for retiring now 
and the maximum possible value of this SSW for later ages at retirement. 
Let us call PV(a, y) the “peak value”—that is, the maximum of the W(a , y 
  a  – a) that can be attained for departures at ages higher than or equal to 
a and a∗, the corresponding age.
The aggregation of W – PV, using the same kind of formula as formula (1), 
is given by the bottom line of ﬁ  gure 4.5. The pattern of W – PV unfortunately 
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appears diﬃcult to interpret. Previous results on microdata had underlined 
the importance of the peak value or of the distance to the peak value in the 
decision to retire. Following the microresults, an increase in W – PV (W – 
PV is negative) should induce a decrease in the labor force participation. 
An increase in W – PV indeed means that individuals are approaching the 
optimal date to claim their pension. The 1983 pension reform in France 
induces a discontinuity in the age of the peak value. Before the reform, the 
optimal age to claim a pension was sixty-  ﬁ  ve; it moves to sixty in 1983. The 
discontinuity in W – PV makes the aggregation diﬃcult. Thus, ﬁ  gure 4.5 
shows that W – PV presents a decreasing pattern in 1983, even if we were 
expecting the reverse.
Nevertheless, we have attempted to build an index, mixing the incentives 
properties of both PV and (W – PV). The elementary formula is of the 
form:
(2)  I(a, y, r)   W(a, y)   e r(a∗ a)[W(a, y)   PV   (a, y)].
It can be interpreted as a weighted average between the gain from leav-
ing immediately and the additional gain from postponing until the age that 
maximizes W, with a weighted factor for future gains equal to e–  r(a∗–  a), which 
will be proxied by a constant factor  . A global index ibar is computed as the 
global index wbar from formula (1). The conventional values     0.3 and 
    0.7 lead to the last two curves on ﬁ  gure 4.5. Given the relatively small 
diﬀerence between these curves and the initial one, we shall here concentrate 
on results based on W only. For comparison purposes with other countries, 
we give results based on the ‘ibar’ approach (equation [2]) in the appendix.
4.4.2      Measuring the Impact of Pension Policy 
Indices on Labor Market Outcomes
Tables 4.3 to 4.5 present the eﬀects of aggregate social security wealth 
on diﬀerent labor market outcomes: labor force participation of the old 
(denoted LFPold) and unemployment and employment rates of the young 
(denoted, respectively, Uyouth and Eyouth). Several speciﬁ  cations and sets 
of control variables are used to test the robustness of the results. In addi-
tion to the three control variables used in table 4.1 (GDP per capita, growth 
of GDP per capita—denoted DGDP—and the share of manufacturing in 
GDP—denoted MS), we have also used the mean age of the ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to 
sixty- ﬁ   ve  age  group  (denoted  MA_5565)16 and the ratio of the minimum 
wage to the average wage (denoted MW). As in our previous analysis, the 
mean school leaving age (denoted MSLA) is used to measure the impact of 
16. The labor force participation of the old is inﬂ  uenced by changes in the age structure. In 
particular, large changes in the mean age of the ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four age group were expe-
rienced in France between 1974 and 1985 as a result of the low fertility rates during World 
War I; that is, cohorts born between 1915 and 1918 are much smaller than previous and later 
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education policies, which might have been fostered by concerns about youth 
unemployment and are essential in explaining the drop in youth labor force 
participation in France.17
All three tables have the same structure. In the top part, we present the 
coeﬃcients of the wealth index according to various speciﬁ  cations. In the 
ﬁ  rst speciﬁ  cation (column [1]), we use the same set of control variables as in 
table 4.1 (GDP per capita, its growth rate, and the share of manufacturing 
in production). In the following columns, we add or remove control variables 
according to their relevance for the corresponding labor market outcome; 
that is, the mean age of the ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  ﬁ  ve age group in the LFPold 
regression or the minimum wage for Eyouth and Uyouth. The number of 
observations being relatively low (a maximum of thirty-  eight observations 
to a minimum of thirty-  two when taking the ﬁ  fth diﬀerences of the vari-
ables), we test the robustness of these regressions by limiting the number of 
control variables, either for the business cycle (GDP per capita, its growth 
rate) or the productive structure of the economy (the share of manufacturing 
in production), in order to leave explaining power for the more speciﬁ  c vari-
ables (columns [3] and [4]). Endogeneity of the pension policy in the French 
political context, as discussed previously, is an issue that could not be put 
aside. We try to address this issue by implementing some Granger causality 
tests in a bivariate framework. We present these results in the bottom part 
of each table. Control variables are introduced as exogenous variables (we 
do not have enough degrees of freedom to deal with all variables as endog-
enous ones). We have two bivariate systems to estimate—youth unemploy-
ment and the pension wealth index and youth employment and the pension 
wealth index—and we test if past youth employment (or unemployment) 
could improve the prediction of the pension wealth index; that is, if youth 
unemployment (or employment) at date t helps to better predict the pension 
wealth index at date t   1, whatever the exogenous variables.
Table 4.3 corresponds to the regressions with all the variables in levels. 
First, the eﬀect of the wealth index on the labor force participation of the old 
has the expected negative sign. However, it is not signiﬁ  cant in speciﬁ  cation 
(2), which includes the largest set of controls, and in speciﬁ  cation (3), for 
which the growth rate of GDP per capita has been omitted. When compar-
ing speciﬁ  cations (1) and (4), the inclusion of the mean age of the ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve 
to sixty-  ﬁ  ve age group instead of the share of manufacturing in production 
increases the negative impact on the labor force participation of the old of 
the pension incentives index. For the other labor market outcomes, the eﬀect 
of the wealth index is always signiﬁ  cant, whatever the set of the control 
variables, and is with a similar size and the same sign: negative for both the 
17. The share of the young in school (denoted Syouth) could be an alternative measure of 
these education policies. Yet, it is linked by an identity relationship to the unemployment and 
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unemployment and employment of youth and positive for the schooling 
of youth. An increase in the social security wealth index is associated both 
with lower youth employment and lower youth unemployment. This result 
is not completely surprising, given that the pension wealth index is also 
associated positively with the share of the young in school. To rephrase 
this result in the light of our previous descriptive analysis (section 4.3), at a 
time of increased youth unemployment, both early retirement policies and 
expansion of schooling have taken place. Taking into account these educa-
tion policies, which is done in table 4.5, may allow us to help shed light on 
the relationship between retirement policies and the labor market status of 
the young.
When looking at the results of the causality tests, we accept Granger 
causality between the unemployment of youth and the wealth index in both 
directions, whereas we reject it between the employment of youth and the 
wealth index. It is therefore more cautious to avoid causal interpretation of 
the eﬀect of the wealth index on the youth labor market outcomes, given 
these endogeneity issues.
Results in table 4.4 correspond to regressions with all the variables in ﬁ  fth 
diﬀerences. Diﬀerentiation is a way to address the endogeneity issue. By 
diﬀerencing, we lose control variables, such as the growth of GDP per capita, 
and we implement only two speciﬁ  cations. As we lose almost 10 percent of 
our observations, the coeﬃcient of the wealth index is no longer signiﬁ  cant 
in the regression on the labor force participation of the old. As a result, the 
regressions on the other outcomes cannot be interpreted in a causal way. 
Table 4.3  Regressions in level, wealth index estimated coeﬃcient
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)
LFPold –0.022 –0.000 –0.000 –0.093
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008)
Uyouth –0.04 –0.076 –0.070 –0.057
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016)
Eyouth –0.191 –0.189 –0.196 –0.194
(0.018) (0.022) (0.020) (0.023)
Syouth 0.244 0.234 0.242 0.219
(0.015) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
Causality tests
 Uyouth  → W yes yes yes yes
 W  → Uyouth yes yes yes yes
 Eyouth  → W no no no no
 W  → Eyouth   no   no   no   no
Notes: (1): LFPold   GDP, DGDP, MS; Uyouth, Eyouth, Syouth   GDP, DGDP, MS. 
(2): LFPold   GDP, DGDP, MS, MA_5565; Uyouth, Eyouth, Syouth   GDP, DGDP, MS, 
MW. (3): LFPold   GDP, MS, MA_5565; Uyouth, Eyouth, Syouth   GDP, MS, MW. 
(4): LFPold   GDP, DGDP, MA_5565; Uyouth, Eyouth, Syouth   GDP, DGDP, MW. 
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Surprisingly, the coeﬃcient of the pension wealth index on the other labor 
market outcomes remains signiﬁ  cant and of the same sign (the size is more 
volatile) as in the regressions in levels. The Granger causality tests conﬁ  rm 
the results obtained in table 4.3. These results reinforce the need to control 
for education policies.
Table 4.5 is very similar to table 4.3, except that we systematically add the 
mean school leaving age in each set of control variables. There remain only 
two explained variables—employment and unemployment of youth—since 
the mean school leaving age is not relevant for the ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  ﬁ  ve age 
group (the coeﬃcient for the LFPold regression is then the same as in table 
Table 4.4  Regressions in ﬁ  fth diﬀerences, wealth index estimated coeﬃcient










 Uyouth  → W yes yes
 W  → Uyouth yes yes
 Eyouth  → W no no
   W  → Eyouth   no   no  
Notes: (1): LFPold   GDP, MS; Uyouth, Eyouth, Syouth   GDP, MS. (2): LFPold   GDP, 
MS, MA_5565; Uyouth, Eyouth, Syouth   GDP, MS, MW. Parameters in bold are signiﬁ  cant 
at the 5-percent threshold.
Table 4.5  Regressions in levels, with the mean school leaving age added: Wealth 
index estimated coeﬃcients
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)
Uyouth –0.106 –0.052 –0.063 0.024 –0.062
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.031) (0.045)
Eyouth –0.140 –0.047 0.078 –0.124 –0.148
(0.033) (0.039) (0.039) (0.048) (0.038)
Causality tests
 Uyouth  → W yes yes yes yes yes
 W  → Uyouth yes yes yes no yes
 Eyouth  → W no no no yes no
 W  → Eyouth   no   no   no   no   no
Notes: (1): GDP, DGDP, MS. (2): GDP, DGDP, MS, MW. (3): GDP, MS, MW. (4): GDP, 
DGDP, MW. (5): GDP, DGDP. Parameters in bold are signiﬁ  cant at the 5-percent thresh-
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4.3), and it is certainly endogeneous in the Syouth regression. The eﬀect 
of the wealth index on unemployment or employment of the youth and 
Granger causality between the wealth and the two outcomes of interest are 
the same as in table 4.3 when controlling for the mean school leaving age.
The causality tests lead us to conﬁ  rm that these variables are indeed 
endogenous. Causal relationships are therefore impossible to establish, and 
we are left with the weak evidence of previous sections.
4.5    Conclusion
The main objective of this chapter has been to study the link between 
youth labor market status and older workers’ labor force participation in the 
case of France. The main reforms favoring early retirement policies in the 
decade between 1975 and 1985 were based, at least in the political debate, on 
the argument that they would foster young workers’ employment. Evidence 
of the correlation between youth labor market outcomes and old work-
ers’ labor force participation plead more in favor of a positive association 
between young and old workers in the labor market. An increase in the old 
workers’ participation is indeed correlated with an increase in the employ-
ment rate of young workers and a decrease in their unemployment rate. Even 
when controlling for the economic cycle, this positive association remains—
albeit less robustly. These correlations based on time series, however, are not 
evidence of a causal relationship between young and old employment. For 
a start, even if we had been able to properly measure substitution between 
these two age groups, controlling for total output in the economy, we would 
not be able to state that these policies have been eﬀective in the long term, 
unconditional on output. In our case, we do not ﬁ  nd evidence of substitution 
conditional on output. The second caveat of these time series correlations is 
that it is impossible to exclude the possibility that they are not faced with a 
simultaneity issue—that is, that general employment conditions, not taken 
into account in our controls, could explain both employment of the young 
and of the old.
To deal with this problem, we instead use the LFP rates of older workers 
in an index summarizing the intensity of policies aimed at removing older 
workers from the labor market, based on social security wealth. The eﬀect 
of the wealth index on youth labor market outcomes is always signiﬁ  cant, 
whatever the set of control variables we use, and is with a similar size and 
the same sign. The coeﬃcient is negative for both the unemployment and 
employment of youth, with or without controlling for school attendance. 
Granger causality tests between unemployment of youth and the wealth 
index show a signiﬁ  cant link in both directions, whereas nothing is signiﬁ  -
cant between the employment of youth and the wealth index.
Establishing a causal relationship of the reduction of labor force partici-
pation of the old on employment prospects of the young is indeed challeng-
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endogeneity of the policies at stake, one is constrained to look—within one 
country—at time series. If we do not ﬁ  nd evidence that reducing the labor 
force participation of the old provides jobs for the young, we cannot exclude 
altogether the possibility that some general and unaccountable cause is hid-
ing their true eﬀect.
Appendix
Tables 4A.1 and 4A.2 are deﬁ  ned as table 4.3, and tables 4A.3 and 4A.4 are 
deﬁ  ned as table 4.5, except that the pension index here is a composite index, 
deﬁ  ned as:
I(a, y, r)   W(a, y)   e r(a∗ a)[W(a, y)   PV   (a, y)].
The main issue with this pension index is to ﬁ  nd a value for  , which is a 
kind of subjective preference for the present rate. According to the average 
values of diﬀerent long-  term and no-  risk interest rates for the time period, 
it can range from 0.3 to 0.7. We thus replicate the same exercise as for the 
wealth index for two pension indices (denoted ibar), and tables 4A.1 and 
4A.3 (respectively, tables 4A.2 and 4A.4) report the results for     0.3 
(respectively,     0.7). Globally, the results are very similar to the results 
obtained with the wealth index. Indeed, we ﬁ  nd that the paradoxal results 
remain; that is, the complementarity between youth employment and the 
Table 4A.1  Regressions in level,   0.3
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)  
LFPold –0.001 –0.021 –0.001 –0.096
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009)
Uyouth –0.082 –0.040 –0.074 –0.067
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016)
Eyouth –0.202 –0.198 –0.198 –0.209
(0.023) (0.019) (0.019) (0.024)
Syouth 0.251 0.254 0.257 0.242
(0.019) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018)
Causality tests
 Uyouth  → ibar yes yes yes yes
 Ibar  → Uyouth yes yes yes yes
 Eyouth  → ibar no no no no
   Ibar  → Eyouth  no   no   no   no  
Notes: (1): LFPold   GDP, DGDP, MS, MA_5565; Uyouth, Eyouth, Syouth   GDP, DGDP, 
MS, MW. (2): LFPold   GDP, DGDP, MS; Uyouth, Eyouth, Syouth   GDP, DGDP, MS. 
(3): LFPold   GDP, MS, MA_5565; Uyouth, Eyouth, Syouth   GDP, MS, MW. (4): LFPold 
  GDP, DGDP, MA_5565; Uyouth, Eyouth, Syouth   GDP, DGDP, MW. Parameters in 
bold are signiﬁ  cant at the 5-percent threshold.Table 4A.2  Regressions in level,   0.7
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)  
LFPold –0.001 –0.021 –0.101 –0.001
(0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011)
Uyouth –0.090 –0.040 –0.083 –0.080
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014)
Eyouth –0.221 –0.207 –0.226 –0.226
(0.024) (0.020) (0.027) (0.022)
Syouth 0.276 0.266 0.273 0.278
(0.017) (0.011) (0.016) (0.015)
Causality tests
 Uyouth  → ibar yes yes yes yes
 Ibar  → Uyouth yes yes yes yes
 Eyouth  → ibar no no no no
   Ibar  → Eyouth  no   no   no   no  
Notes: (1): LFPold   GDP, DGDP, MS, MA_5565; Uyouth, Eyouth, Syouth   GDP, DGDP, 
MW. (2): LFPold   GDP, DGDP, MS; Uyouth, Eyouth, Syouth   GDP, DGDP, MW. (3): 
LFPold   GDP, MS, MA_5565; Uyouth, Eyouth, Syouth   GDP, MS, MW. (4): LFPold   
GDP, DGDP, MA_5565; Uyouth, Eyouth, Syouth   GDP, DGDP, MW.
Table 4A.3  Regressions in level with mean school leaving age,   0.3
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)
Uyouth –0.123 –0.065 –0.077 0.018 –0.093
(0.029) (0.032) (0.031) (0.037) (0.049)
Eyouth –0.160 –0.056 –0.091 –0.141 –0.167
(0.037) (0.045) (0.045) (0.056) (0.042)
Causality tests
 Uyouth  → ibar yes yes yes yes yes
 Ibar  → Uyouth yes yes yes no yes
 Eyouth  → ibar no no no no no
 Ibar  → Eyouth  no   no   no   yes   no
Notes: (1): GDP, DGDP, MS. (2): GDP, DGDP, MS, MW. (3): GDP, MS, MW. (4): GDP, 
DGDP, MW. (5): GDP, DGDP.
Table 4A.4  Regressions in level with mean school leaving age,   0.7
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)
Uyouth –0.152 –0.091 –0.103 –0.004 –0.153
(0.031) (0.038) (0.036) (0.049) (0.052)
Eyouth –0.193 –0.071 –0.113 –0.165 –0.191
(0.044) (0.055) (0.054) (0.071) (0.048)
Causality tests
 Uyouth  → ibar yes yes yes yes yes
 Ibar  → Uyouth yes yes no no yes
 Eyouth  → ibar no no no no no
 Ibar  → Eyouth  no   no   no   yes   no
Notes: (1): GDP, DGDP, MS. (2): GDP, DGDP, MS, MW. (3): GDP, MS, MW. (4): GDP, 
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pension index in one hand and the substitutability with unemployment in 
the other hand.
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